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ABSTRACT
Much of the literature on optimal monetary policy uses models in which the
degree of nominal price flexibility is exogenous. There are, however, good
reasons to suppose that the degree of price flexibility adjusts endogenously to
changes in monetary conditions. This paper extends the standard New
Keynesian model to incorporate an endogenous degree of price flexibility. The
model shows that endogenising the degree of price flexibility tends to shift optimal
monetary policy towards complete inflation stabilisation, even when shocks take the
form of cost-push disturbances. This contrasts with the standard result obtained in
models with exogenous price flexibility, which show that optimal monetary policy
should allow some degree of inflation volatility in order to stabilise the welfare-
relevant output gap.
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1 Introduction
Much of the recent literature on optimal monetary policy uses models in which the degree
of nominal price flexibility is imposed exogenously (see for example Clarida, Gali and
Gertler (1999), Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2005)). There are, however,
good theoretical and empirical reasons to suppose that the degree of price flexibility
adjusts endogenously to changes in economic conditions, including changes in monetary
policy. The ability of monetary policy to aﬀect the real economy is closely linked to the
degree of price flexibility, so endogenous changes in price flexibility may in turn have
important eﬀects on the design of welfare maximising monetary policy.
This paper extends the standard New Keynesian DSGE model to incorporate an en-
dogenous degree of price flexibility and uses this model to analyse optimal monetary policy
in the face of stochastic shocks. The model is based on an adaptation of the Calvo (1983)
price setting structure. The key diﬀerence compared to the standard version of the Calvo
model is that we allow producers to choose the average frequency of price changes. We
assume that producers face costs of price adjustment which are increasing in the average
frequency of price changes and we allow producers optimally to choose the degree of price
flexibility based on the balance between the costs and benefits of price adjustment.
The model demonstrates the link between monetary policy and the equilibrium degree
of price flexibility. Monetary policy, by determining the volatility of macro variables,
aﬀects the stochastic environment faced by producers. This has an impact on the benefits
of price flexibility for individual producers and thus aﬀects the optimal degree of price
flexibility. For example, for a given cost of price adjustment, the greater is the volatility
of CPI inflation, the larger will be the benefits of price flexibility for individual producers.
Producers will therefore tend to choose a greater frequency of price adjustment when the
volatility of CPI inflation is large. A monetary rule which allows volatility in CPI inflation
will therefore tend to imply more price flexibility in equilibrium.
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Having established a framework which captures the connection between monetary
policy and price flexibility, we re-examine one of the main results from the standard
literature on welfare maximising monetary policy. This result (analysed in detail by,
for instance, Woodford (2003)) is that, in the face of cost-push shocks, it is optimal
for monetary policy to allow some volatility in CPI inflation in order to stabilise the
“welfare-relevant output gap”. This result is obtained in models where the degree of
price flexibility is exogenous. How might this result be changed when the degree of price
flexibility is endogenised? Will endogenising the degree of price flexibility make it optimal
for the monetary authority to raise or lower the volatility of inflation? On the one hand,
an increase in the volatility of inflation will tend to increase the equilibrium degree of
price flexibility. This implies that output prices can more easily respond to shocks. But it
also reduces the ability of monetary policy to aﬀect the real economy and thus reduce the
eﬀectiveness of monetary policy in tackling the distortionary eﬀects of cost-push shocks.
Our model shows that endogenising the degree of price flexibility tends to shift the
focus of optimal monetary policy towards a reduction in inflation volatility relative to
the case of exogenous price flexibility. Indeed, when the degree of price flexibility is
endogenous, it appears that optimal policy should completely stabilise CPI inflation in
the face of cost-push shocks. This is in sharp contrast to the standard result emphasised
in Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2005). The essential point is that, lower
inflation volatility tends to reduce the equilibrium degree of price flexibility. This both
enhances the power of monetary policy and reduces the resource cost of price adjustment.
Besides demonstrating these results, this paper makes a technical modelling contribu-
tion by showing how to incorporate endogenous price flexibility into an otherwise standard
New Keynesian model. Romer (1990), Devereux and Yetman (2002) and Yetman (2003)
have previously proposed adaptations of the Calvo model which are similar in nature
to the one described below. However, unlike Romer and Devereux and Yetman, we in-
corporate the modified approach into the standard microfounded New Keynesian model
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widely used by the recent literature on optimal monetary policy. The optimal choice of
price flexibility in our model is based on an approximation of individual utility functions
derived directly from the microfoundations of the model. This contrasts with the Romer
and Devereux and Yetman approach, which is based on largely ad hoc macro models and
an ad hoc approximation of the profit function. Note also that the main issue examined by
Romer (199) and Devereux and Yetman (2002) is the impact of a non-zero (but constant)
rate of inflation on the equilibrium degree of price flexibility. They do not consider the
impact of inflation volatility or output volatility on the equilibrium degree of price flexi-
bility, nor do they analyse welfare maximising monetary policy in the face of stochastic
shocks.
In two further related papers Devereux and Yetman (2003, 2010) analyse exchange
rate pass-through using a version of the Calvo model which incorporates endogenous
price flexibility. These papers are particularly notable because they are amongst the
first to introduce this modification into a microfounded general equilibrium model (in
this case an open economy model). In technical terms, there are close parallels with our
modelling approach.1 However, Devereux and Yetman again base their analysis on an
ad hoc approximation of the profit function. This contrasts with our approach, which is
directly based on the utility function of individual producers. Moreover, in order to solve
their model, Devereux and Yetman either assume that all shocks are i.i.d. (Devereux
and Yetman, 2003) or they make use of stochastic simulation techniques (Devereux and
Yetman, 2010). In contrast to this, we show that, for quite general cases, it is possible
to derive a closed-form representation for the relationship between producers’ utility and
the degree of price flexibility. This greatly facilitates the derivation of equilibrium in our
1The parallels with this paper are primarily technical. The research questions tackled by Devereux and
Yetman (2003, 2010) are entirely focused on how price flexibility aﬀects exchange rate pass-through in
open economies. In contrast, we are analysing the implications of endogenous price flexibility for optimal
monetary policy in a closed economy setting.
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model.
The model we describe clearly builds on the standard Calvo (1983) approach to price
stickiness and thus shares many of the benefits, as well as the drawbacks, of the Calvo
model. There are a number of other approaches to modelling endogenous price flexibility,
but an important advantage of our approach is that it is based on, what has become, the
general workhorse model used throughout the monetary policy literature.
Other approaches to endogenising price flexibility include the models described by
Calmfors and Johansson (2006), Devereux (2006), Kiley (2000), Levin and Yun (2007)
and Senay and Sutherland (2006). A number of these contributions focus on the impli-
cations of endogenous price flexibility for the long run trade-oﬀ between inflation and
output, while others analyse the implication of endogenous price flexibility for the prop-
agation of monetary shocks and the causes and nature of business cycles. Only Calmfors
and Johansson (2006), Devereux (2006) and Senay and Sutherland (2006) consider the in-
teraction between endogenous price flexibility and monetary policy choices. Calmfors and
Johansson (2006) analyse the stabilising properties of endogenising wage flexibility for a
small open economy joining a monetary union, while Devereux (2006) analyses the impli-
cations of exchange rate policy for the flexibility of prices in an open economy stochastic
general equilibrium model. In Senay and Sutherland (2006) we consider the impact of
exchange rate regime choice and price elasticity of international trade on the equilibrium
degree of price flexibility in an open economy general equilibrium model.2
2The degree of price flexibility is, in a sense, also endogenous in models of state-dependent pricing. In
these models prices may or may not adjust following a shock, depending on the size, duration and nature of
the shock, and the costs of price adjustment. This approach is considerably more diﬃcult to implement in
a general equilibrium model suitable for analysing optimal monetary policy. Examples of state-dependent
pricing models include Devereux and Siu (2007), Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999), Dotsey and King
(2005) and Golosov and Lucas (2007). These contributions typically focus on the implications of state
dependent pricing for inflation and business cycle dynamics, as well as the propagation of monetary
shocks.
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This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 explains
how we solve for the equilibrium level of price flexibility. Section 4 describes how the
equilibrium degree of price flexibility is aﬀected by diﬀerent assumptions about the costs
of price adjustment and other key parameter in the model. Section 5 shows how welfare
and optimal monetary policy is aﬀected by endogenising the degree of price flexibility.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Themodel is a variation of the sticky-price general equilibrium structure which has become
standard in the recent literature on monetary policy. The model world consists of a single
country which is populated by yeoman-farmers indexed on the unit interval. Each yeoman-
farmer consumes a basket of all goods produced in the economy and is also a monopoly
producer of a single diﬀerentiated product. In what follows, we refer to individual yeoman-
farmers as “producers” or “consumer-producers”.
Price setting follows the Calvo (1983) structure. In any given period, producer j is
allowed to change the price of good j with probability (1− γ(j)).
The timing of events is as follows. In period 0 the monetary authority makes its choice
of monetary rule. Immediately following this policy decision, all producers are allowed to
make a first choice of price for trade in period 1 (and possibly beyond). Simultaneously,
all producers are also allowed the opportunity to make a once-and-for-all choice of Calvo-
price-adjustment probability (i.e. γ(j)). In each subsequent period, beginning with period
1, stochastic shocks are realised, individual producers receive their Calvo-price-adjustment
signal (which is determined by their individual choices of γ, i.e. γ(j)), those producers
which are allowed to adjust their prices do so, and finally trade takes place.
The model economy is subject to stochastic shocks from three sources: labour supply,
government spending and cost-push (or mark-up) shocks.
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2.1 Preferences
All consumer-producers have utility functions of the same form. The utility of consumer-
producer j is given by
Ut (j) = Et
" ∞X
s=t
βs−t
µ
C1−ρs (j)
1− ρ −
χKs
μ
yμs (j)
¶#
−A(γ(j)) (1)
where C is a consumption index defined across goods, y (j) is the output of good j and Et
is the expectations operator (conditional on time t information). K is a stochastic shock
to labour supply preferences which evolves as follows
logKt = δK logKt−1 + εK,t (2)
where 0 < δK < 1 and εK is symmetrically distributed over the interval [−ε, ε] with
E[εK ] = 0 and V ar[εK] = σ2K .
The expected costs of adjusting prices are represented by the function A(γ(j)). The
form of this function is discussed in more detail below.
The consumption index C is defined as
Ct =
∙Z 1
0
ct (i)
φ−1
φ di
¸ φ
φ−1
(3)
where φ > 1, c (i) is consumption of good i. The aggregate consumer price index is
Pt =
∙Z 1
0
pt (i)
1−φ di
¸ 1
1−φ
(4)
The budget constraint of consumer-producer j is given by
Bt + Ct (j) = rtBt−1 + pt (j) yt (j) /Pt +Rt (5)
where Bt represents holdings of risk-free real bonds at the end of period t, rt is the gross
real rate of return on bonds and Rt is the payoﬀ to a portfolio of state-contingent assets
which are optimally chosen to hedge against income risk caused by Calvo price setting.
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The intertemporal dimension of consumption choices gives rise to the familiar con-
sumption Euler equation
C−ρt (j) = βrtEt
£
C−ρt+1(j)
¤
(6)
and individual demand for representative good j is given by
ct (j) = Ct
µ
pt (j)
Pt
¶−φ
(7)
Perfect consumption risk sharing implies for all i and j
C−ρt (j) = C
−ρ
t (i)
2.2 Government Spending Shocks
Government spending, Gt, is defined as a basket of individual goods with an aggregator
function similar to (3). Government demand for representative good j is therefore given
by
gt (j) = Gt
µ
pt (j)
Pt
¶−φ
(8)
Total demand for good j is thus
yt (j) = ct (j) + gt (j) = Yt
µ
pt (j)
Pt
¶−φ
(9)
where aggregate output can be defined as
Yt = Ct +Gt (10)
Aggregate government spending is assumed to be a stochastic AR(1) process which evolves
as follows
Gt − G¯ = δG(Gt−1 − G¯) + εG,t (11)
where G¯ is the steady state level of government spending, 0 < δG < 1 and εG is symmet-
rically distributed over the interval [−ε, ε] with E[εG] = 0 and V ar[εG] = σ2G. In what
follows we will assume that G¯ = 0.
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2.3 Price Setting and Cost-push Shocks
In equilibrium, all producers will choose the same value of γ(j), which will be denoted
by γ. The determination of γ is discussed below. Thus, in any given period, proportion
(1− γ) of producers are allowed to reset their prices. All producers who set their price
at time t choose the same price, denoted xt. The first-order condition for the choice of
prices implies the following
Et
( ∞X
s=t
(βγ)s−t
"
xζtYs
CρsP 1−φs
− φ
(φ− 1)
χΛsKsY μs
P−φμs
#)
= 0 (12)
where ζ = 1−φ(1−μ) and Λ is a stochastic shock to the mark-up which evolves as follows
logΛt = δΛ logΛt−1 + εΛ,t (13)
where 0 < δΛ < 1 and εΛ is symmetrically distributed over the interval [−ε, ε] with
E[εΛ] = 0 and V ar[εΛ] = σ2Λ. The first order condition can be re-written as follows
xζt =
φχ
(φ− 1)
Bt
Qt
(14)
where
Bt = Et
( ∞X
s=t
(βγ)s−tΛsKsY μs P
φμ
s
)
Qt = Et
( ∞X
s=t
(βγ)s−t YsC−ρs P
φ−1
s
)
It is possible to re-write the expression for the aggregate consumer price index as
follows
Pt =
"
(1− γ)
∞X
s=0
γsx1−φt−s
# 1
1−φ
(15)
For the purposes of interpreting some of the results reported later, it proves useful to
consider the price that an individual producer would choose if prices could be reset every
period. This price is denoted pot and is given by the expression
po ζt =
φχ
(φ− 1)ΛtKtY
μ−1
t P
ζ
t C
ρ
t (16)
We refer to this price as the “target price” or “desired price”.
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2.4 Costs of Price Adjustment
Price flexibility is made endogenous in this model by allowing all producers to make a
once-and-for-all choice of the Calvo-price-adjustment probability in period zero.3 When
making decisions with regard to price flexibility each producer acts as a Nash player.
Given that all producers are infinitesimally small, the choice of individual γ(j) is made
while assuming that the aggregate choice of γ is fixed. The equilibrium γ is assumed to
be the Nash equilibrium value (i.e. where the individual choice of γ(j) coincides with the
aggregate γ).
Producers make their choice of γ in order to maximise the discounted present value of
expected utility. From the point of view of the individual producer, the optimal γ is the
one which equates the marginal benefits of price flexibility with the marginal costs of price
adjustment. The benefits of price flexibility arise because a low value of γ implies that the
individual price can more closely respond to shocks. The costs of price adjustment may
take the form of menu costs, information costs, decision making costs and other similar
costs. These costs of price adjustment are captured by the function A(γ(j)) in equation
(1). It is assumed that the cost of price adjustment is proportional to the expected number
of price changes per period, i.e. proportional to 1−γ(j). Thus A(γ(j)) is of the following
form
A(γ(j)) =
α
1− β (1− γ(j)) (17)
where α > 0 and the factor 1/(1 − β) converts the per-period cost of price changes to
the present discounted value at time zero. It is important to note that the cost of price
flexibility is a function of the average rate of price adjustment, and is not linked to actual
3By restricting the choice of γ to period zero we avoid the need to track the distribution of γ0s across
the population of producers as the economy evolves. Given that our main objective is to investigate how
the choice of γ responds to the choice of monetary rule, and given that the choice of the monetary rule is
itself assumed to be a once-and-for-all decision, it is unlikely that much is lost by restricting the choice
of γ in this way.
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price changes.
As is standard in the literature, individual producers are assumed to have access to
insurance markets which allow them to insure against the idiosyncratic income shocks
implied by the Calvo pricing structure.
2.5 Monetary Policy
Monetary policy is modelled in the form of a targeting rule. The monetary authority
is assumed to choose the monetary instrument (which is the nominal interest rate, it =
rtPt−1/Pt) in order to ensure that the following targeting relationship holds
log
Pt
Pt−1
+ ψ log
Yt
Y ∗t
= 0 (18)
where Y ∗t is monetary authority’s target output level. We assume that Y ∗t is chosen to be
the welfare maximising output level. This implies that Y ∗t is a function of labour supply,
government spending and cost-push disturbances. The determination of Y ∗t is specified
in more detail below and follows the definition used in Benigno and Woodford (2005).
Thus the monetary authority follows a state-contingent inflation targeting policy where
ψ measures the degree to which inflation is allowed to vary in response to changes in the
welfare-relevant output gap. The analysis below focuses on the welfare implications of the
choice of ψ. A rule of this form is of particular interest because it is known to be optimal
in the context of a model analogous to the model outlined above but where the degree of
price flexibility is exogenously specified (see for instance Benigno and Woodford, 2005).
Note that it is not necessary to specify explicitly the form of the interest rate rule which
delivers the targeted outcome defined by (18).
3 Model Solution
It is not possible to derive an exact solution to the model described above. The model
is therefore approximated around a non-stochastic equilibrium (defined as the solution
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which results when K = Λ = 1, G = G¯ and σ2K = σ2Λ = σ2G = 0). In what follows a bar
indicates the value of a variable at the non-stochastic steady state and a hat indicates the
log deviation from the non-stochastic equilibrium.4
Our objective is to solve for the Nash equilibrium value of γ. In order to do this it
is necessary to consider in detail the optimal choice of γ(j) at the level of the individual
producer. Before going into detail, however, we outline our general solution approach.
First note that, for a given value of aggregate γ it is possible to solve for the behaviour
of the aggregate economy. The behaviour of the aggregate economy is, by definition,
unaﬀected by the choices of an individual consumer-producer (because each consumer-
producer is assumed to be infinitesimally small). It is therefore possible to analyse the
choices of producer j while taking the behaviour of the aggregate economy as given. This
allows us to solve for the expected evolution of producer j’s output price as a function of
aggregate γ and γ(j). In turn, using the solutions for aggregate variables and producer
j’s output price, it is possible to solve for the utility of producer j for given values of γ
and γ(j).
It is thus possible to analyse producer j’s utility as a function of γ(j). In particular,
the utility maximising value of γ(j) can be identified for any given value of γ. In other
words, it is possible to plot the “best response function” of producer j to aggregate γ.
Using the best response function it is straightforward to identify Nash equilibria in the
choice of γ. A Nash equilibrium is simply one where the utility maximising choice of γ(j)
is equal to aggregate γ.
Below we show the detailed derivation of each stage of this solution process. We start
with the aggregate economy, then move on to producer j’s utility and prices. We are
then able to derive an explicit solution for producer j’s utility as a function of γ and
γ(j). We use a grid search technique to analyse the utility function and to plot the best
response function. This allows us to identify all possible Nash equilibria for each parameter
4Except in the case of government spending, where Gˆ = (G− G¯)/Y¯ .
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combination. We show the solution for aggregate prices and producer j’s prices for all
three types of shocks (labour supply, government spending and cost-push disturbances).
However, for the sake of simplicity we show the closed form solution for producer j’s
utility function for the case of cost-push shocks only. The extension to the other shocks
is straightforward.
3.1 The Aggregate Economy
For a given value of aggregate γ, the aggregate economy behaves exactly like the standard
New Keynesian model analysed by Benigno and Woodford (2005) (and many others). In
this section we summarise the equations of the aggregate model and derive first-order
accurate solutions for some of the key aggregate price variables. These solutions will then
be used in the derivation of a second-order accurate solution for the utility of producer j.
First-order approximation of equations (14) and (16) imply that the evolution of the
new contract price in period t, xˆt, is given by5
xˆt = (1− βγ)(pˆot − Pˆt) + βγEt[xˆt+1] +O
¡
ε2
¢
In turn, a first-order approximation of (15) implies that xˆt is related to consumer price
inflation as follows
xˆt =
γ
1− γπt +O
¡
ε2
¢
where πt = Pˆt − Pˆt−1. It is therefore possible to write a version of the New Keynesian
Phillips curve in the form
πt =
(1− γ)(1− βγ)
γ
(pˆot − Pˆt) + βEt[πt+1] +O
¡
ε2
¢
Using (16) the optimal price expressed in real terms, pˆot − Pˆt, can be written as follows
pˆot − Pˆt =
1
ζ
[Λˆt + Kˆt + (μ− 1)Yˆt + ρCˆt] +O
¡
ε2
¢
(19)
5All log-deviations from the non-stochastic equilibrium are of the same order as the shocks, which (by
assumption) are of maximum size ε. When presenting an equation which is approximated up to order n
it is therefore possible to gather all terms of order higher than n in a single term denoted O
¡
εn+1
¢
.
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which, after substituting for Yˆt using Yˆt = Cˆt + Gˆt yields
pˆot − Pˆt =
1
ζ
[Λˆt + Kˆt − ρGˆt + (μ+ ρ− 1)Yˆt] +O
¡
ε2
¢
(20)
It is useful to define the natural rate of output, Yˆ Nt , to be the flexible price equilibrium
output level. An expression for Yˆ Nt can be obtained from (16) by imposing the equilibrium
condition pˆot = Pˆt, thus
Yˆ Nt =
1
(μ+ ρ− 1)(−Λˆt − Kˆt + ρGˆt) +O
¡
ε2
¢
(21)
Using (20) and (21) it is possible to write the real optimal price in terms of the “output
gap”
pˆot − Pˆt =
(μ+ ρ− 1)
ζ
(Yˆt − Yˆ Nt ) +O
¡
ε2
¢
(22)
so the New Keynesian Phillips curve can be written in the form
πt = κ(Yˆt − Yˆ Nt ) + βEt[πt+1] +O
¡
ε2
¢
(23)
where
κ =
(1− γ)(1− βγ)
γ
(μ+ ρ− 1)
ζ
The New Keynesian Phillips curve provides one of the key relationships which ties
down equilibrium in the macro economy. The second key relationship is provided by the
policy rule (18), which can be written in the form
πt + ψ(Yˆt − Yˆ ∗t ) = 0 +O
¡
ε2
¢
(24)
Yˆ ∗t is defined to be the welfare maximising output level, which following Benigno and
Woodford (2005) is given by
Yˆ ∗t = cΛΛˆt + cKKˆt + cGGˆt
where
cΛ =
−μΦ
(μ+ ρ− 1)[μ+ ρ− 1 + (1− ρ)Φ]
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cK = −
1
(μ+ ρ− 1)
cG =
ρ[μ+ ρ− 1− ρΦ]
(μ+ ρ− 1)[μ+ ρ− 1 + (1− ρ)Φ]
and where
Φ = 1− φ− 1
φ
Using (22), (23) and (24) it is simple to show that the solution for pˆot − Pˆt can be
written in the form
pˆot − Pˆt = pΛΛˆt + pKKˆt + pGGˆt +O
¡
ε2
¢
(25)
where
pΛ = ΓΛ
1− βδΛ
ζ
, pK = ΓK
1− βδK
ζ
, pG = ΓG
1− βδG
ζ
and where
ΓΛ =
[1 + cΛ(μ+ ρ− 1)]ψ
κ+ ψ(1− βδΛ)
, ΓK =
[1 + cK(μ+ ρ− 1)]ψ
κ+ ψ(1− βδK)
, ΓG =
[cG(μ+ ρ− 1)− ρ]ψ
κ+ ψ(1− βδG)
(26)
Similarly, the solution for πt can be written in the form
πt = πΛΛˆt + πKKˆt + πGGˆt +O
¡
ε2
¢
(27)
where
πΛ = ΓΛ
κ
μ+ ρ− 1 , πK = ΓK
κ
μ+ ρ− 1 , πG = ΓG
κ
μ+ ρ− 1
3.2 Utility of the Representative Producer
In order to derive the equilibrium value of γ it is necessary to consider the impact of the
choice of γ on the utility of a representative individual producer. The utility of producer
j at time zero (i.e. at the time γ(j) is chosen) is given by
U0 (j) = E0
∞X
t=1
βt−1
∙
C1−ρt (j)
1− ρ −
χKt
μ
yμt (j)
¸
− α
1− β (1− γ(j)) (28)
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The usual approach to analysing the optimal choice of a variable is to consider the
first order conditions with respect to that variable. In this case, however, the first or-
der condition of producer j’s utility maximisation problem with respect to γ(j) involves
(expectations of) derivatives which cannot be written explicitly and thus are diﬃcult to
write even in approximated form. It is therefore easier to work directly with the utility
function of producer j, given in equation (28), and to approximate the utility function
directly. It is then possible to derive the first-order condition with respect to γ(j) using
the approximated utility function.
Before approximating the utility function there is one further complication. This is
introduced by the assumption that producers are fully insured against the consumption
risk caused by Calvo pricing uncertainty. This complication can be resolved by replacing
the true utility (28) function with the following expression
U˜0 (j) = E0
∞X
t=1
βt−1
∙
C−ρt
µ
yt (j) pt(j)
Pt
¶
− χΛtKt
μ
yμt (j)
¸
− α
1− β (1− γ(j)) (29)
where the term representing the utility of consumption has been replaced by a term based
on producer j’s output, yt (j), valued using the stochastic discount factor (which is com-
mon to all households). The term representing the disutility of work eﬀort has also been
modified to incorporate cost-push shocks (Λ). This expression has the same derivative
with respect to γ(j) as the true utility function but it pre-imposes the assumption that
all producers have the same marginal utility with respect to consumption.
Appendix A shows that a second-order approximation of (29) can be written in the
form
U˜0(j)− U¯ =
(φ− 1)ζ
2
C¯1−ρE0
∞X
t=1
βt−1
h
−(pˆt(j)− Pˆt)2
+2(pˆot − Pˆt)(pˆt(j)− Pˆt)
i
(30)
+tij − α
1− β (1− γ(j)) +O
¡
ε3
¢
where tij represents terms independent of producer j.6
6Note that in deriving (30) we approximate with respect to C, y, p(j), P , Λ, etc, but not with
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We will evaluate and use (30) to analyse the optimal choice of γ(j) for producer j.
Before analysing this equation in more detail, it is useful to consider the general form of
(30) in order to understand the underlying links between γ(j) and producer j’s utility. The
choice of γ(j) most obviously aﬀects utility via the costs of price adjustment. However,
γ(j) also aﬀects utility via its impact on the evolution of producer j’s output price, pˆt(j).
Equation (30) shows that there are two routes by which the evolution of pˆt(j) aﬀects
utility. The first route arises via the term E0[(pˆt(j)− Pˆt)2]. This term eﬀectively captures
the variance of pˆt(j) relative to the general price level. A higher variance of pˆt(j) − Pˆt
implies lower utility. Note that the variance of pˆt(j) − Pˆt depends on the diﬀerence
between the flexibility of pˆt(j) and the flexibility of Pˆt. This is captured by the diﬀerence
between γ(j) and aggregate γ. This term is therefore likely to create a tendency for the
individual producer to prefer a value of γ(j) close to aggregate γ. The second route by
which the evolution of pˆt(j) aﬀects utility arises via the term E0[(pˆot − Pˆt)(pˆt(j) − Pˆt)].
This term is eﬀectively the covariance between the actual price charged by producer j and
the optimal price if producer j had complete freedom to choose a new price every period.
Not surprisingly, an increase in the covariance has a positive eﬀect on utility. Also not
surprisingly, this covariance is negatively related to γ(j), i.e. the more rigid is pˆt(j) the
less correlated it can be with pˆot .7
The eﬀect of γ(j) on utility is a combination of these three eﬀects, i.e. it is a com-
bination of the eﬀect on the costs of price adjustment, the variance of pˆt(j) − Pˆt and
the covariance between pˆt(j) and pˆot . An increase in γ(j) will reduce the costs of price
respect to γ(j). We are thus treating γ(j) in the same way as the parameters of the monetary policy
rule are treated in the monetary policy literature where policy rules are analysed using a second-order
approximation of aggregate utility.
7Note that Romer (1990) and Devereux and Yetman (2002) use an ad hoc profit function of the
form K [pˆt(j)− pˆot ]
2. This can be expanded to yield K
£
pˆ2t (j)− 2pˆot pˆt(j) + pˆo2t
¤
. If it is noted that pˆo2t is
independent of the actions of producer j this can be written as K
£
pˆ2t (j)− 2pˆot pˆt(j)
¤
+ tij which has the
same form as the first term in (30).
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adjustment and will thus increase utility, but it will also tend to reduce the covariance
between pˆt(j) and pˆot which tends to reduce utility. The eﬀect of an increase in γ(j) on the
variance of pˆt(j)− Pˆt will depend on whether γ(j) is greater than or less than aggregate
γ. The optimal γ(j) will obviously depend on the net outcome of the interaction of all
these three factors.
3.3 Producer j Prices
In order to analyse equation (30) in more detail it is necessary to derive equations which
describe the evolution of producers j’s price, i.e. pˆt(j). In particular it is necessary to
derive second-order accurate solutions for E0[(pˆot − Pˆt)(pˆt(j)− Pˆt)] and E0[(pˆt(j)− Pˆt)2].
This requires first-order accurate solutions for the behaviour of pˆt(j).
Since pˆt(j) depends on xˆt(j) (i.e. the optimal price chosen when producer j is allowed
to reset the price of good j) it is first necessary to solve for the first-order accurate
behaviour of xˆt(j). Appendix B shows that the first-order condition for producer j’s
pricing decision implies
xˆt(j)− Pˆt = (1−βγ(j))(pˆot − Pˆt)+βγ(j)Et[xˆt+1(j)− Pˆt+1]+βγ(j)Et[πt+1]+O
¡
ε2
¢
(31)
By combining this with (25) it is possible to show that
xˆt(j)− Pˆt = xΛΛˆt + xKKˆt + xGGˆt +O
¡
ε2
¢
(32)
where
xΛ = ΓΛ
(1− βδΛ)(1− βγ(j))(μ+ ρ− 1) + κζβδΛγ(j)
(1− βδΛγ(j))(μ+ ρ− 1)ζ
xK = ΓK
(1− βδK)(1− βγ(j))(μ+ ρ− 1) + κζβδKγ(j)
(1− βδKγ(j))(μ+ ρ− 1)ζ
xG = ΓG
(1− βδG)(1− βγ(j))(μ+ ρ− 1) + κζβδGγ(j)
(1− βδGγ(j))(μ+ ρ− 1)ζ
Equation (32) provides one of the required components in solving for E0[(pˆot − Pˆt)(pˆt(j)−
Pˆt)] and E0[(pˆt(j)− Pˆt)2].
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To complete the solution for E0[(pˆot − Pˆt)(pˆt(j)− Pˆt)] and E0[(pˆt(j)− Pˆt)2] it is useful
to decompose the expectations operator E0 into ED0 , expectations across aggregate dis-
turbances, and EC0 , expectations across the Calvo pricing signal for producer j, where
E0[.] = ED0 [EC0 [.]]. Since aggregate disturbances and aggregate variables are independent
from the Calvo pricing signal for producer j, we may write
E0[(pˆot − Pˆt)(pˆt(j)− Pˆt)] = ED0 [(pˆot − Pˆt)EC0 [pˆt(j)− Pˆt]]
This makes clear that it is necessary to obtain a solution for the first-order accurate
behaviour of EC0 [pˆt(j) − Pˆt].8 Appendix B shows that the first-order accurate behaviour
of EC0 [pˆt(j)− Pˆt] is governed by the following
EC0 [pˆt(j)− Pˆt] = γ(j)EC0 [pˆt−1(j)− Pˆt−1] + (1− γ(j))(xˆt(j)− Pˆt)− γ(j)πt +O
¡
ε2
¢
(33)
This can be solved and combined with (25) and (32) to yield a second-order accurate
expression for E0[(pˆot − Pˆt)(pˆt(j)− Pˆt)].
In a similar way Appendix B shows that the second-order behaviour of E0[(pˆt(j)−Pˆt)2]
is governed by the following
E0[(pˆt(j)− Pˆt)2] = γ(j)E0[(pˆt−1(j)− Pˆt−1)2] + γ(j)E0[π2t ]
−2γ(j)ED0 [πtEC0 (pˆt−1(j)− Pˆt−1)] (34)
+(1− γ(j))E0[(xˆt(j)− Pˆt)2] +O
¡
ε3
¢
which can be solved in combination with (25) and (32) to yield a second-order accurate
expression for E0[(pˆt(j)− Pˆt)2].
3.4 Closed Form Solution for Utility
Using equations (25), (27), (32), (33) and (34) we can derive a closed-form solution for
the utility of producer j. For the sake of simplicity we focus on the case where the only
8To be clear, EC0 [pˆt(j)− Pˆt] is the expected value of pˆt(j)− Pˆt conditional on particular realised values
of the aggregate disturbances, Λˆt, Kˆt and Gˆt.
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source of shocks is the cost-push disturbance, Λ. Extending the expression to incorporate
the other two shocks is straightforward. The resulting expression is
U˜0(j)− U¯ = −
ζ(φ− 1)C¯1−ρ∆σ2Λ
2(1− β)(1− βδ2)(1− βδγ(j))(1− βγ(j))
+tij − α
1− β (1− γ(j)) +O
¡
ε3
¢
(35)
where
∆ = (1− βδΛγ(j))(1− γ(j))x2Λ + (1 + βδΛγ(j))γ(j)π2Λ
−2βδΛγ(j)(1− γ(j))xΛπΛ − 2(1− βγ(j))[(1− γ(j))xΛpΛ − γ(j)πΛpΛ]
Equation (35) shows the dependence of producer j’s utility on aggregate γ and γ(j).
This expression therefore allows us to identify producer j’s optimal choice of γ(j) for any
given value of γ.
In principle it would be possible to analyse the optimal choice of γ(j) by examining
the derivatives of (35). The resulting expressions are however very complex. Furthermore,
because the choice of γ(j) must lie in the [0, 1] range (since it is a probability) the optimal
choice of γ(j) may be a corner solution rather than an interior solution. It is therefore
easier to analyse (35) by means of a numerical grid search technique. This is the most
reliable way to identify the global maximising value of γ(j) within the [0, 1] range for
each γ in the [0, 1] range. We use this grid search technique to plot the best response
function for each parameter combination. In turn, this allows us to identify all possible
Nash equilibria for each parameter combination.9
9Devereux and Yetman (2003) derive a closed-form solution for their model which plays a similar role
to (35). However, their expression is only valid for the case of i.i.d. shocks. Our expression (35) is valid
for the general case of autoregressive shocks. But note that our model diﬀers from the Devereux and
Yetman model in many respects, so our expression (35) does not encompass the equivalent expression in
Devereux and Yetman (2003).
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Discount factor β = 0.99
Elasticity of substitution for individual goods φ = 8.00
Work eﬀort preference parameter μ = 1.50
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution ρ = 1
Price adjustment costs α = 0.00055
Cost-push shocks δΛ = 0.9, σΛ = 0.01
Policy parameter ψ = 0.05
Table 1: Parameter Values
3.5 Calibration
We analyse the model using a wide range of parameter values, but as a benchmark we
choose the set of values shown in Table 1. Most of the values chosen are quite standard
and require no explanation. The only parameter which requires some discussion is α, i.e.
the coeﬃcient in the function determining the costs of price adjustment. The function
A(γ(j)) in principle captures a wide range of costs associated with price adjustment. Not
all these costs are directly measurable, so there is no simple empirical basis on which
to select a value for α. As a starting point, for the purposes of illustration, the value
of α is set at 0.00055 in the benchmark case. In equilibrium this implies prices are
adjusted at an average rate of once every four quarters (i.e. γ = 0.75) so aggregate price
adjustment costs are 0.01375 per cent of GDP in equilibrium. This total aggregate cost is
not implausibly high, given the potentially wide range of costs incorporated in A(γ(j)),
but it is acknowledged that a more satisfactory basis needs to be found for calibrating α.
In order to test the sensitivity of the main results we consider a wide range of alternative
values for α.
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4 The Equilibrium Degree of Price Flexibility
This section presents numerical results which illustrate the general nature and proper-
ties of equilibrium in the model described above. We also discuss the implications for
equilibrium γ of variations in the main parameters of the model.
Figure 1 illustrates some of the main features of equilibrium in the benchmark case (i.e.
the parameter set in Table 1) and a number of simple variations around that benchmark
case. Figure 1 plots the optimal value of γ(j) against values of aggregate γ. In other
words it shows the “best response function” of producer j against aggregate γ. The
benchmark case is illustrated with the plot marked with circles. This plot is nearly
horizontal, implying that the optimal value of γ(j) is little aﬀected by aggregate γ, and it
intersects the 450 just once. This point of intersection represents a single Nash equilibrium
where γ(j) = γ ≈ 0.75.
The position of the best response function, and its shape, are contingent on the values
of other parameters of the model. A change in the value of any parameter implies a change
in the best response function and a change in the equilibrium value of γ. Figure 1 shows
four other examples of best response function - each based on a diﬀerent value of α, the
parameter which determines price adjustment costs. The general pattern that emerges
from the cases illustrated in Figure 1 is that an increase in α shifts the best response
function upwards, and thus leads to an increase in the equilibrium value of γ, while a
reduction in α shifts the best response function downwards and thus leads to a reduction
in the equilibrium value of γ. The intuition for this result is simple - an increase in the
cost of price adjustment implies that it is optimal to reduce the degree of price flexibility
(i.e. increase γ), while a reduction in the cost of price adjustment has the opposite eﬀect.
Figure 1 also illustrates a number of other potentially important features of the best
response function. In one of the cases shown (where α = 0.005) the best response function
does not intersect with the 450 line within the zero-one interval. In this case the Nash
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equilibrium is a corner solution at γ = 1, i.e. completely fixed prices. In other words,
when the costs of price adjustment are suﬃciently high, producers optimally choose to
avoid price adjustment entirely. The next lower plot shown in Figure 1, where α = 0.0015,
illustrates another possibility. In this case the best response function intersects the 450
line in two places. There are thus two Nash equilibria. At the other extreme, when α
is very low, it is possible to find an equilibrium where prices are completely, or almost
completely flexible, i.e. equilibrium γ is close to zero.10
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between equilibrium γ and the costs of price ad-
justment, α, in more detail. This figure shows that equilibrium γ rises rapidly at low levels
of α, but the rate of increase then falls and equilibrium γ is relatively insensitive to α for
values of α greater than 0.0005. Notice that, for values of α greater than (approximately)
0.00022 there is no Nash equilibrium within the zero-one interval. For this range of α the
Nash equilibrium is a corner solution at γ = 1.
Figures 3 - 8 illustrate the eﬀects of varying φ, the elasticity of substitution between
goods, μ, the elasticity of utility with respect to work eﬀort, and ρ, the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. In each case we show the impact of varying each parameter on
the best response function, and we also plot the resulting equilibrium value of γ. These
plots show that, at least for the range of parameters used here, the equilibrium γ is
relatively insensitive to variations in φ, μ and ρ.
Finally, Figures 9 and 10 show the eﬀects of varying the parameter of the monetary
policy rule, ψ. This parameter measures the degree to which policy is aimed at stabilising
inflation relative to stabilising the welfare-relevant output gap, Yˆ − Yˆ ∗. The higher is ψ
the more monetary policy is aimed at stabilising the output gap, while a lower value of
10For some extreme parameter combinations it is possible to find knife-edge cases where the utility
function of producer j has two peaks yielding equal utility levels. In these knife-edge cases there appears
to be no Nash equilibrium where all producers choose the same γ(j). There may be equilibria where the
set of producers divides into two groups, each group setting a diﬀerent value of γ (corresponding to the
two utility maxima). We do not investigate these equilibria in this paper.
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ψ implies that monetary policy is aimed at stabilising inflation. ψ = 0 implies complete
inflation stabilisation. Figures 9 and 10 show that the best response function of producer
j and the equilibrium γ are quite sensitive to the choice of ψ. A higher value of ψ shifts
the best response function downwards and therefore reduces the equilibrium value of γ.
In other words, the more policy focuses on stabilisation of the output gap, the greater
is equilibrium price flexibility. Conversely, the more monetary policy focuses on inflation
stabilisation, the greater will be price stickiness.
The intuition behind this result is relatively straightforward. If the monetary authority
is stabilising aggregate inflation it is by definition stabilising the desired price, pˆot . This
can be seen very clearly from equations (25), (26) and (27) which show the impact of
shocks on inflation and the desired price. These equations show that the lower is the
value of ψ, the more stable is pˆot . If the desired price is very stable then the incentive to
incur the costs of price flexibility are much reduced, hence producers choose a high value
of γ, i.e. more price stickiness. In the extreme case where ψ = 0 (i.e. perfect inflation
stabilisation) the equilibrium value of γ is unity, implying perfect price rigidity.
Equations (25), (26) and (27) also show that a high value of ψ (i.e. a monetary rule
which allows fluctuations in inflation in order to achieve some stabilisation of the output
gap) will necessarily cause fluctuations in the desired price, pˆot . This raises the incentive
for producers to incur the costs of price flexibility and therefore choose a lower value of γ.
Figure 10 shows that, beyond a certain value of ψ (in this case approximately 0.43) the
equilibrium value of γ is zero, implying perfectly flexible prices.
5 Welfare and Optimal Policy
We now consider the welfare implications of endogenous price flexibility. In particular
we consider the implications for the welfare maximising choice of the policy parameter,
ψ. For the purposes of this exercise aggregate welfare in period 0 (i.e. at the time the
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monetary policy parameter, ψ, is set) is defined as
Ω = E0
∞X
t=1
βt−1
½Z 1
0
µ
C1−ρt (j)
1− ρ −
Kt
μ
yμt (j)
¶
dj
¾
− α
1− β (1− γ) (36)
and a second-order approximation of Ω can be written as follows
Ω− Ω¯ = C¯1−ρE0
∞X
t=1
βt−1
½
Cˆt +
1
2
(1− ρ)Cˆ2t
−φ− 1
φ
∙
Yˆt +
1
2
μ(Yˆt +
1
μ
Kˆt)2 +
1
2
φζγ
(1− γ)(1− βγ)π
2
t
¸¾
(37)
− α
1− β (γ¯ − γ) +O
¡
ε3
¢
Figure 11 plots welfare against a range of values for ψ. This figure shows the behaviour
of welfare for the case of endogenous price flexibility. As a point of comparison, it also
shows a plot of welfare for the case where price flexibility is exogenously fixed at a given
level. In this example we set γ = 0.75. The exogenous γ case corresponds to the standard
model widely analysed in the literature on optimal monetary policy (see e.g. Benigno and
Woodford (2005)) and it is therefore a natural point of comparison.
The welfare plot for the exogenous γ case shows that the optimal value of ψ is approx-
imately 0.012. This implies that it is optimal for monetary policy to allow some volatility
in inflation in order to achieve some stabilisation of the welfare-relevant output gap. This
corresponds to the result emphasised by Benigno and Woodford (2005). This result is
quite standard and is analysed and explained in detail by Benigno and Woodford (2005).
In essence, cost-push shocks of the type assumed in this model, are distortionary and
imply that the flexible price equilibrium is sub-optimal. In a sticky price environment it
is therefore not optimal for monetary policy to reproduce the flexible price equilibrium.
Sticky prices give monetary policy some degree of leverage which can be used to stabilise
output around the welfare maximising level. This requires some volatility in inflation.
In terms of the policy rule of the form assumed in this model, it is optimal for ψ to be
positive, as implied by the welfare plot in Figure 11.
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The second plot in Figure 11 shows welfare when price flexibility is endogenous. The
parameter values and the relationship between ψ and the equilibrium value of γ are as
shown in Figure 10 (although the range of values of ψ shown in Figure 11 is narrower
than in Figure 10). It is immediately clear from Figure 11 that, in the endogenous price
flexibility case, welfare appears to increase monotonically as ψ decreases towards zero. In
other words, when price flexibility is endogenous, it appears to be optimal to engage in
strict inflation stabilisation. This is in complete contrast to the case of exogenous price
flexibility, as analysed by Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2005), where it
is optimal to allow some variability in inflation.
The contrast between the two cases arises for two reasons. Firstly, as ψ is reduced,
the rise in the equilibrium value of γ reduces the resource cost of price flexibility (i.e.
fewer price changes imply lower costs). Secondly, the rise in the equilibrium value of
γ implies that monetary policy becomes a more eﬀective policy tool (because the real
eﬀects of monetary policy depend on the presence of nominal rigidities and these become
more significant as γ increases). Therefore, as γ increases, monetary policy becomes more
eﬀective in dealing with the distortions caused by cost-push shocks. This is reflected in a
higher level of welfare as ψ decreases and γ increases.
This result represents a significant departure compared to the literature based on
exogenous price flexibility. That literature has emphasised that complete inflation stabil-
isation is not optimal in the face of cost-push shocks. The comparison shown in Figure
11 implies that this result may be overturned when price flexibility is endogenised.
Of course, Figure 11 is based on just one set of parameter values. Nevertheless,
experiments (not reported) testing the sensitivity of this basic qualitative result indicate
that it is robust across a wide range of values for key parameters, such as φ, μ and ρ.
The results described above focus entirely on the implications of cost-push shocks.
Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2005), using models with exogenous price
flexibility, show that government spending shocks are very similar to cost-push shocks in
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terms of their implications for optimal monetary policy. This similarity carries over into
our model, so extending our results to consider shocks toG add no significant new insights.
Extending our analysis to consider labour supply shocks (i.e. shocks to K in our model)
also adds little. Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2005), using models of
exogenous price flexibility, show that optimal monetary policy should completely stabilise
inflation in the face of labour supply shocks (i.e. policy should replicate the flexible price
equilibrium). In that case, our model of endogenous price flexibility simply predicts that
prices will be completely rigid. This has no impact on the nature of optimal monetary
policy in the face of labour supply shocks.
6 Conclusion
This paper takes a standard sticky-price general equilibrium model and incorporates a
simple mechanism which endogenises the degree of nominal price flexibility. We show
how the degree of price flexibility is determined within the model and analyse the eﬀects
of key parameter values on the equilibrium degree of price flexibility. The analysis shows
that the equilibrium degree of price flexibility is sensitive to changes in monetary policy.
The more weight monetary policy places on the stabilisation of the output-gap, the more
flexible prices become. Conversely, the more weight monetary policy places on inflation
stabilisation, the more inflexible prices become. The paper also analyses welfare maximis-
ing monetary policy when the degree of price flexibility is endogenous. This is compared
to welfare maximising monetary policy in the case of exogenous price flexibility. We show
that endogenising the degree of price flexibility tends to shift optimal monetary policy
towards complete inflation stabilisation, even when shocks take the form of cost-push
disturbances. This contrasts with the standard result obtained in models with exogenous
price flexibility, which show that optimal monetary policy should allow some degree of
inflation volatility in order to stabilise the welfare-relevant output gap.
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Appendix A: Approximation of Producer j’s Utility
A second-order approximation of (29) is derived as follows. First substitute for yt (j) to
yield
U˜0 (j) = E0
∞X
t=1
βt−1
"
C−ρt Yt
µ
pt(j)
Pt
¶1−φ
− χΛtKt
μ
Y μt
µ
pt(j)
Pt
¶−φμ#
− α
1− β (1− γ(j)) (38)
which can be written as
U˜0 (j) = E0
∞X
t=1
βt−1
"
α1,t
µ
pt(j)
Pt
¶1−φ
− α2,t
µ
pt(j)
Pt
¶−φμ#
− α
1− β (1− γ(j)) (39)
where
α1,t = C
−ρ
t Yt and α2,t =
χΛtKtY
μ
t
μ
This form of the utility function isolates terms which depend on γ(j). A second order
approximation of (39) implies
U˜0(j)− U¯ = C¯1−ρE0
∞X
t=1
βt−1
∙
αˆ1,t −
φ− 1
φμ
αˆ2,t
−(φ− 1)ζ
2
(pˆt(j)− Pˆt)2 +
1
2
αˆ21,t −
φ− 1
2φμ
αˆ22,t
−(φ− 1)αˆ1,t(pˆt(j)− Pˆt) + (φ− 1)αˆ2,t(pˆt(j)− Pˆt)
i
(40)
− α
1− β (1− γ(j)) +O
¡
ε3
¢
which can be simplified to
U˜0(j)− U¯ = −
(φ− 1)
2
C¯1−ρE0
∞X
t=1
βt−1
h
ζ(pˆt(j)− Pˆt)2
−2(αˆ2,t − αˆ1,t)(pˆt(j)− Pˆt)
i
(41)
+tij − α
1− β (1− γ(j)) +O
¡
ε3
¢
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where tij represents terms independent of producer j. Note that
αˆ2,t − αˆ1,t = Λˆt + Kˆt + μYˆt + ρCˆt − Yˆt +O
¡
ε2
¢
which, from (19) implies
αˆ2,t − αˆ1,t = ζ(pˆot − Pˆt) +O
¡
ε2
¢
so
U˜0(j)− U¯ =
(φ− 1)ζ
2
C¯1−ρE0
∞X
t=1
βt−1
h
−(pˆt(j)− Pˆt)2
+2(pˆot − Pˆt)(pˆt(j)− Pˆt)
i
(42)
+tij − α
1− β (γ¯ − γ(j)) +O
¡
ε3
¢
which is equation (30) in the main text.
Appendix B: Expected Dynamics of Producer j’s Price
The first-order condition for price setting for producer j has the same form as (14) and
therefore implies
xˆt(j) = (1− βγ(j))pˆot + βγ(j)Et[xˆt+1(j)] +O
¡
ε2
¢
or
xˆt(j)− Pˆt = (1− βγ(j))pˆot − Pˆt + βγ(j)Et[xˆt+1(j)− Pˆt] +O
¡
ε2
¢
(43)
Using the relationship
Et[xˆt+1(j)− Pˆt] = Et[xˆt+1(j)− Pˆt+1] +Et[πt+1]
equation (43) can be written as
xˆt(j)− Pˆt = (1− βγ(j))(pˆot − Pˆt) + βγ(j)Et[xˆt+1(j)− Pˆt+1] + βγ(j)Et[πt+1] +O
¡
ε2
¢
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which is equation (31) in the main text.
The Calvo pricing process implies that EC0 [pˆt(j)−Pˆt] evolves according to the following
equation
EC0 [pˆt(j)− Pˆt] = γ(j)EC0 [pˆt−1(j)− Pˆt] + (1− γ(j))(xˆt(j)− Pˆt) +O
¡
ε2
¢
(44)
Using the relationship
EC0 [pˆt−1(j)− Pˆt] = EC0 [pˆt−1(j)− Pˆt−1]− πt
equation (44) can be written as
EC0 [pˆt(j)− Pˆt] = γ(j)EC0 [pˆt−1(j)− Pˆt−1] + (1− γ(j))(xˆt(j)− Pˆt)− γ(j)πt +O
¡
ε2
¢
which is equation (33) in the main text.
An equation for the evolution of E0[(pˆt(j)−Pˆt)2] can be derived in a similar way. First
note that the Calvo pricing process implies that
E0[(pˆt(j)− Pˆt)2] = γ(j)E0[(pˆt−1(j)− Pˆt)2] + (1− γ(j))E0[(xˆt(j)− Pˆt)2] +O
¡
ε3
¢
(45)
Using the relationships
E0[(pˆt−1(j)− Pˆt)2] = E0[(pˆt−1(j)− Pˆt−1)2] +E0[π2t ]− 2E0[πt(pˆt−1(j)− Pˆt−1)]
and
E0[πt(pˆt−1(j)− Pˆt−1)] = ED0 [πtEC0 (pˆt−1(j)− Pˆt−1)]
equation (45) can be written as
E0[(pˆt(j)− Pˆt)2] = γ(j)E0[(pˆt−1(j)− Pˆt−1)2] + γ(j)E0[π2t ]
−2γ(j)ED0 [πtEC0 (pˆt−1(j)− Pˆt−1)]
+(1− γ(j))E0[(xˆt(j)− Pˆt)2] +O
¡
ε3
¢
which is equation (34) in the main text.
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Figure 1: Price Adjustment Costs and the Best Response Function
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Figure 2: Price Adjustment Costs and Equilibrium γ
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Figure 3: φ and the Best Response Function
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Figure 4: φ and Equilibrium γ
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Figure 5: μ and the Best Response Function
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Figure 6: μ and Equilibrium γ
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Figure 7: ρ and the Best Response Function
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Figure 8: ρ and Equilibrium γ
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Figure 9: ψ and the Best Response Function
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Figure 10: ψ and Equilibrium γ
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